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Book Reviews
PUBLIC UTILITY FINANCING, 1930-35, by Merwin H. Waterman.
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 144 pages. 1936.
Public Utility Financing 1930-35, which is one of the series of “Michigan
business studies,” published under the auspices of the bureau of business re
search of the school of business administration of the University of Michigan,
does not deal with matters of accounting. Its interest to the accountant is
necessarily from the broader aspect of the familiarity with matters of finance
and business procedure which is essential to the exercise of accountancy as a
profession. The volume must, accordingly, be examined from that point of
view.
At the outset let it be frankly said that the present reviewer is an executive
of one of the larger public-utility holding companies. His viewpoint is in con
sequence somewhat subject to the limitations imposed by first-hand knowledge
of the problems confronting the industry during the several years just passed.
He has perhaps been rendered a little sensitive on certain points by the un
discriminating attacks directed against the industry during the past few years,
which have so greatly increased its difficulties in emerging from the effects of
the industrial depression. Professor Waterman must not, therefore, take it
amiss if his contribution to the study of public-utility financing, which reads in
many parts like an echo of the unsound philosophy underlying the public
utility holding company act of 1935, is criticized from that viewpoint, more
particularly where it appears somewhat gratuitously to go beyond the scope of
the study which was undertaken, to delve into some other aspects of the
holding-company situation and condemn the soil as being neither fertile nor
auriferous.
The volume consists of five chapters: purpose and motivation (of the public
utility financing during this six year period); characteristics of security con
tracts; capital costs and methods of security distribution; holding companies
and public-utility finance; and holding-company diversification. The fourth
and fifth chapters are those in which Professor Waterman’s conclusions with
regard to the lack of usefulness of holding companies are chiefly elaborated,
but the first three chapters do not entirely ignore this aspect of the matter.
Professor Waterman has assembled information of a financial and statistical
character useful as a record of utility financing during the period following the
peak of expansion in general business at the end of 1929 down to the end of 1935
when previous peaks in kilowatt-hour output had already been exceeded and
the electric industry, if unencumbered by the federal legislation of 1935 and free
from the threat of destructive federal competition and subsidies in aid of arti
ficially fostered municipal competition, would have been in a position to enter
upon a new period of plant expansion and development.
Of great significance are the figures presented in the tables prepared by
Professor Waterman, setting forth the facts as to the decline in public-utility
security offerings from $2,381,781,152 in 1930 to $92,731,478 in 1933, with a
subsequent increase to $1,294,421,747 in 1935; but more significant still is the
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fact that while in 1930 the security offerings made for the purpose of expansion
amounted to $1,916,794,855, or 80.5% of the total offerings, in 1935 only
$17,659,109, or 1.4% of the total, was for this purpose, the remaining 98.6%
being for funding, refunding and refinancing. Of further significance is the
fact that only 2.2% of the offerings in 1935, or $28,990,847, represented pre
ferred and common stock, while 32.2%, or $766,822,152, fell under these cate
gories in 1930. Of this latter total $410,000,000 represented common stock of
telephone companies, but the balance remaining for other utilities is still a very
substantial amount, representing many times the corresponding amount for
1935.
A detailed table of the public-utility bond redemptions which occurred in
1935 is given, the totals of which show that the new money rate, calculated after
bankers’ commissions but before other expenses of issue, averaged 3.39%
against an average interest rate of 5.14% on the issues called. Out of the
savings in interest, there must be amortized in some manner the premium paid,
which averaged 4.69%, upon the call of the old issues. Professor Waterman’s
first chapter discusses this transition period in an effective manner.
In the second chapter dealing with characteristics of security contracts,
Professor Waterman shows a tendency, which is apparent in other chapters of
this volume, to fall into the error of attacking human devices, which represent
the best that can be done in a changing world, because those devices do not
afford perfect protection under all conditions. There is little to be gained in
criticizing the desire of timid capital for that degree of security afforded by
first mortgage bonds, on the ground that the mortgagee faces an almost in
evitable loss if the mortgaged property loses its earning power. Financial in
stitutions and the legal profession will continue to regard a first mortgage obli
gation as preferable to a debenture or preferred stock. From the point of view
of the borrowing company, the modern form of open-end mortgage does not
represent an unreasonably restrictive device for the securing of senior capital at
the lowest interest cost. In some respects there is an advantage in setting that
class of creditor, who seldom contributes more than 50% of the total capital
required, apart from other capital groups, who in consideration of a somewhat
higher return on their capital are willing to accept a subordinate position from
the standpoint of security and must be prepared to permit considerable flexi
bility and independence of judgment to the management. It was to be ex
pected that in the greater part of the period covered by this study, mortgage
bonds would represent the required medium for financing.
Professor Waterman makes a somewhat surprising statement as to what he
regards as a growing demand for retirement provisions with respect to senior
securities. On the basis of his study, he finds that 84% of the bond offerings in
1934 and 82% of those in 1935 contain “some sort of provision for debt re
tirement” (page 33). Professor Waterman does not agree that this is a desir
able tendency as applied to utility securities and this reviewer is in entire agree
ment with him on that point. The results of his study, however, may some
what exaggerate the tendency. There is a vast difference between a sinking
fund which calls for the extinguishment of debt by annual retirements and a
purchase fund which must be applied to the purchase in the market of bonds
up to a specified amount if they are available below a stipulated price. If the
bonds are not so available, the purchase fund is inoperative and does not have
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to be set aside. This is a common provision in indentures, but it should not be
treated as equivalent to a sinking fund. Another type of retirement provision,
which calls for the application to the purchase or redemption of bonds of the
amount remaining from a certain percentage of operating revenue after provi
sion for maintenance, replacements and new construction, or some combination
of these three factors, also hardly ranks as more than a protective provision for
the upkeep of the mortgaged property. It is possible by simple inspection to
extract from the list of bond redemptions in 1935 an amount substantially
greater than 18% of the total offerings in 1935 which do not provide for any
retirement provisions other than of the types just indicated. There have been
cases during this period of the issuance of securities with serial maturities, obvi
ously for the purpose of securing the very low money costs at which such securi
ties could be sold under the abnormal conditions prevailing, but these together
with the cases in which true sinking funds have been provided for appear on the
basis of an analysis of over 85% of the security issues to amount to less than
25% of the total offerings in 1935.
In the chapter dealing with capital costs and methods of security distribu
tion, the significance of the volume of financing done by direct placement with
financial institutions can be easily overemphasized. It reflects a somewhat
abnormal investment situation, accentuated by the premium placed on this
type of financing by its freedom from the requirement of registration under the
security act. As a general principle, however, it may be doubted whether it is
desirable, either from the point of view of the financial institutions or of the
utility companies, that undue proportions of single issues of individual com
panies should be absorbed by such institutions, and it seems unlikely that
bankers are suffering any permanent impairment of their usefulness to their
clients in the placing of securities. Professor Waterman’s discussion of costs of
registration and of bankers’ spreads is interesting, although one can not agree
with certain of his conclusions. He believes that experience with registration
procedure tends to a material reduction in such expenses and points to the
relatively high cost of the Detroit Edison registration (1%) as being no doubt
due, in part at least, to the fact that its offering represented the company’s first
contact with registration requirements. This is carrying deductive reasoning
rather too far. An examination of the registration statement of Detroit Edison
shows that of the $491,000 of expense of the issue, $294,000 represented state of
Michigan fee and mortgage tax on bonds, of which $245,000 was to be paid
under protest. The balance of the expenses represented less than 4/10ths of
1 % of the amount of the issue.
The time element involved in registration requirements is ignored as a
potential cost of financing. During this extraordinary bond market, the time
element has operated as a rule in favor of the borrower, but there have been
periods in the past when the reverse would have been the case, and we have all
of us lived through periods when the interval of time required for registration
would have rendered financing, intrinsically sound, entirely impossible. Per
haps, however, we must regard such potential casualties as some of the eggs
which must be broken to make good omelets. Professor Waterman’s state
ment that bankers’ margins were much lower than they had been prior to the
days of regulation and its accompanying publicity appears to point to a conclu
sion which may not be well founded. Bankers’ margins have undoubtedly
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been substantially affected by the volume of capital seeking investment and by
the fact that by far the greater part of the offerings which have been made
have been of the highest type, appealing to insurance companies and other
financial institutions. Publicity may not affect the situation when money
rates harden and bankers are called upon to do a real selling job in order to
place securities.
In view of Professor Waterman’s feeling with regard to the lack of real
security afforded by mortgage bonds, it is interesting to see his comment
(page 77) to the effect that the economic condition of a company or an industry
can be about as accurately forecast for fifty years as it can for twenty. There
are, of course, limits to human foresight, but given stable political conditions, it
is surely not rash to assume that the trends in a great industry, essential in
character, can be projected conservatively over a twenty-year period. The
purchasers of bonds have evidently concluded that these trends can be ade
quately projected over a thirty-year period, but they have shown a reasonable
disposition not to go beyond that. The electric industry, after all, is hardly
more than fifty years old, counting even from its feeble beginnings, and to
assume that we can just as well anticipate the developments of another fifty
years is going too far.
Coming now to chapters four and five which deal more particularly with the
relationship of holding companies to the industry, we find the tendency referred
to before to assume that perfection is claimed for the holding company form of
ownership in its financing, in its relation to investors and in all its ways,—a
perfection so far exceeding ordinary human attainments that no other form of
utility ownership can conceivably match it. Having shown that this degree of
perfection does not exist, Mr. Waterman proceeds to condemn the institution
itself. This, it is submitted, is neither logical nor fair.
In the chapter dealing with holding companies and public-utility finance,
Professor Waterman gives some instances in which the holding company has
been of service to subsidiary companies by rendering financial assistance when
it was sorely needed, but he goes to greater lengths in an attempt to show that
the holding companies have been in part responsible for the need of their sub
sidiaries for additional capital, owing to their having received dividends from
these same companies. The fact that holding companies are investors in their
subsidiaries, and as such are entitled to a return on their investments in order
that they may be in a position, in turn, to make distributions to the investors
in their own securities, frequently seems to be overlooked by critics of the
industry. No holding company, so far as this reviewer knows, has undertaken
to pose as Santa Claus. They do for the most part claim to have acted in a
reasonable and rational manner towards the companies in which they were
investors and towards which they assumed a protective attitude. If, however,
it is to be assumed that the needs of operating companies for additional capital
required that investors in those companies, whether holding companies or other
investors, should not withdraw earnings in the form of dividends, then obvi
ously no utility company would ever have paid any dividends, until possibly
the last three or four years, the requirements for new capital having constantly
exceeded the amount available for dividends until that time.
In making his point Professor Waterman sees no obstacle in some cases to
arriving at the requisite aggregate of dividends by including dividends paid
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subsequent to the period when the need for the loan arose and, in at least one
case, subsequent to the time when the subsidiary had permanently financed its
requirements. The consideration of the proper timing of a security issue by an
operating company must not be overlooked. It may be undesirable to do financ
ing during the progress of a large construction project, and it is at such times,
particularly, that the assistance of the holding company may be most valuable.
Professor Waterman’s arguments otherwise suggest that holding company
sponsorship is undesirable unless it can be shown that the subsidiaries of holding
companies can finance on better terms than independent companies. This
argument is entirely fallacious. It is, of course, not possible to say what any of
the subsidiaries of holding companies would have been able to do in the way of
financing had they remained independent. A comparison on these lines with
what was actually accomplished might have some validity. It must be
remembered that some of the companies not under holding-company sponsor
ship are among the strongest companies in the country. This will be seen by
reference to the table given by Professor Waterman on page 86. These com
panies could not have been expected to do much better had they been included
in holding-company systems. It may be asserted with some degree of confi
dence, based on comparable companies which are included in holding-company
systems, that they would not have done any worse. The real question is:
Would some of the weaker companies which are under holding-company
sponsorship have done as well had they been independent? Some of them, it is
safe to predict, would have fared considerably worse.
Professor Waterman presents a table (page 90) in support of his statement
that “in the matter of supplying new capital to meet the financial needs of
the utility industry during the years 1930 to 1935, the holding company failed
miserably.” The table, however, shows only the security offerings made by
parent companies, sub-holding companies and operating companies. It does
not show the amount of equity securities of operating companies taken by
parent companies; neither does it reflect the fact, to which attention has already
been drawn, that since 1931 the capital requirements of operating companies
have been almost entirely for refunding purposes and that there has been no
occasion, except in rare instances, to furnish additional equity capital for ex
pansion purposes. Further on in this chapter, Professor Waterman dismisses as
of no consequence the fact of very real assistance given to their subsidiaries by
Commonwealth & Southern Corporation, by United Gas Improvement and
others, by pointing to the fact that these companies were simply reinvesting
revenue which they had received from their investments in those and other
subsidiaries. This is open to the same criticism as that already made, namely,
that investors look for a return upon their investments. The nature of the
business of a holding company is to collect revenue in the form of interest and
dividends and to pay interest and dividends to the investors in its own securi
ties. That they have been able to meet these latter obligations and at the same
time extend financial assistance to their subsidiaries speaks well for the con
servatism which these companies have exercised with respect to their own
working capital positions.
The most that can be said for Professor Waterman’s argument in this chapter
is that the holding companies have developed their subsidiaries to a point at
which they have become largely independent of the kind of assistance which
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the holding companies have been able to extend to them in the past. He actu
ally says (page 97), “. . . holding companies will be left with just one financial
function; namely, to support uneconomic and essentially unprofitable situa
tions.” In an industry which is still growing as rapidly as the electric industry,
it is a hardy character who would undertake to say that the time when even the
strongest companies may welcome financial assistance is past. Even if this
were so, however, a case does not seem to have been made against the holding
companies which would justify their being deprived of their rights as investors
to enjoy the legitimate returns from sound investments well made and carefully
fostered.
Professor Waterman makes one rather naive suggestion in support of his
theory that the holding company is of little use to its subsidiaries in matters
of financing. He speaks (page 87) of “the admittedly important service of
giving advice regarding type of contract or indenture to be used in connection
with a given piece of financing,” but goes on to say, “Such service is one which
the investment banker is paid for, and he certainly is in a position to give advice
and counsel that will be as good, and more unbiased than, advice from the
officials of a public-utility holding company.” The investment banker’s
advice is, of course, useful and is sought by the officers of both operating and
holding companies when financing is being done, but the banker is after all not
entirely unbiased, and even if he were, the company’s interest must be safe
guarded by officers who are admittedly biased in favor of the company. Many
provisions of modern mortgages which are distinctly of service to the company,
and often in the long run to the investor in the securities issued under the
mortgage, would never have been adopted without benefit of forceful advocates
speaking for the company. On the other hand, this opposition of ideas leaves
the banker free to press for more stringent conditions which will facilitate his
sale of the securities to the most exacting investors, who will nevertheless buy a
good security with less onerous conditions if the company is able effectively to
maintain its side of the argument.
Critics of the holding company recognize that a strong argument can be made
for the existence of such companies as a means of affording diversification of
investment to their security holders. Having set out to show that the exten
sion of financial assistance by holding companies to their subsidiaries has
become a dead issue, Professor Waterman next proceeds, in his last chapter, to
show that the principle of diversification never was a live issue; that it is in fact a
myth. Unfortunately for Professor Waterman’s argument, all the facts which
he has assembled not only fail to support his contention, but definitely contra
dict it. Professor Waterman, however, starts by assuming an utterly impossible
and unattainable objective, namely, that diversification should permit an
American investor to escape entirely the effects of a worldwide depression
which culminated with particular severity in this country. If the principle of
diversification which has governed investment policy, whether of individuals,
investment trusts, insurance companies, banks or holding companies, is to
stand or fall by such a test, then there is no argument. One might as well
invest all one’s funds in a single enterprise doing business on a single street
corner. Only the investor who so far diversified his activities as to take the
short side of the market after the boom was over, could meet the standard set
by Professor Waterman.
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The interesting fact is that all the figures and charts prepared by Professor
Waterman show that the ownership of properties in various parts of the country
and possessing varying characteristics did smooth out the hills and valleys of
fluctuating earnings. Professor Waterman, in fact, admits this several times in
his text. The index of variation from a moving five-year average which he has
prepared for a number of holding-company situations shows conclusively, as it
could indeed hardly fail to show, that the variation for the group combined
was substantially less than for the individual units. There are examples in
which the index of variation for the group does not even lie between the maxi
mum and minimum variations of the component parts, although Professor
Waterman suggests in discussing deviations from secular trend (page 137)
that this must necessarily be the case. It is not the case, because the varia
tions are computed from a moving average or straight-line trend, as the case
may be, and expressed, quite properly, as positive values. The figures do not
show, nor will the figures for any group of investments, commodities or activi
ties of any kind show, that diversification had any magic power to avert the
disastrous consequences of the depression. The utilities simply suffered less
than many other industries and the holding companies showed less violent
fluctuations than their constituent companies taken individually. Professor
Waterman himself brings out the fact that utilities in different sections of the
country were affected in varying degrees and at different times during the
period covered by his study.
It is, of course, the desire of every investor to select those investments which
will yield the best results. It is unfortunately not possible for an individual, or
even for a holding company, to make these selections with infallible accuracy.
A holding company does not afford the same degree of flexibility of investment
as an investment trust specializing in utility securities, and the latter in turn is
less flexible than a general investment trust. On the other hand, the holding
company offers an investor in utility securities an opportunity to spread his risk
over a known and substantially fixed group of properties. He might fare
better as an investor in a single one of the group. That, however, would be a
matter of judgment and possibly of price. On the other hand, he might fare
measurably worse as an investor in some other property in the group. Profes
sor Waterman makes this abundantly clear in the figures which he presents and
his rejection of the value of diversification in the face of his own evidence is, to
say the least, a departure from the scientific method of approach.
In case any one should disagree with Professor Waterman’s handiwork, he
adopts the defensive attitude of quarreling with his tools. He suggests that,
“The real significance of these results is difficult to determine because of the
fact that little faith can be placed in the year-by-year profit figures of operating
utilities” (page 110). Auditors of operating companies, please note! Even
were Professor Waterman’s sweeping statement to be taken seriously, it is
rather obvious that for the most part the controllable factors in the accounts
would be made to minimize rather than exaggerate yearly fluctuations, although
Professor Waterman mentions one or two instances which have come to his
attention which, without further investigation, appear to create greater
divergency of results.
Professor Waterman utters a note of rebuke (page 132) to certain holding
companies which have permitted apparently hopeless situations in certain of
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their subsidiary companies to be worked out through the medium of default
and reorganization. Again we are faced with the thought that some other
critic of the industry would probably condemn these same companies for having
persisted too long in trying to bolster up a hopeless situation. It is permissible
to suggest that a holding company is not an eleemosynary institution.
Professor Waterman very gracefully summarizes his conclusions with regard
to holding companies by the time-honored statement that, “You can’t make a
silk purse out of a sow’s ear” (page 133). One is reminded of the prisoner
about to be sentenced for a crime which the judge said had been committed in a
highly skillful and intelligent manner, who begged his honor not to descend to
flattery.
Extended comment in a review may be out of place. That is, perhaps, why
there are too many unsuspecting purchasers of books which dissemble their real
purpose. As to the present volume, therefore, may it be said in brief that it
contains some interesting tabulations and presentations of figures, but that for
the conclusions to be drawn from those figures, the reader must rely on his
own intelligence.
Herbert C. Freeman.
AUDITING LABORATORY SET, by Thomas W. Byrnes and K. Lanneau
Baker. The Ronald Press Co., New York. 1936.
As a unit of the Columbia university accounting series, edited by Professor
Kester, Auditing Laboratory Set is an attempt to solve the problem of supplying
to students of auditing procedure practical material for laboratory work. It
consists of some 300 sheets in type-script containing completely written up
accounts as they would be found in a set of books, with full supporting data
such as vouchers, cheques, bank statements, confirmation letters, invoices, ex
cerpts from minutes, etc. Working conditions are fairly imitated even to the
inclusion of errors, irregularities and defalcations. With these before him the
student is led step by step through an orderly program of audit as prescribed
by any of the standard authorities.
As far as it goes this is an eminently practical method for laboratory work.
It is open to the criticism that it deals with one type of business, textile produc
tion and selling. Much of it would not be applicable to other types, such as
banking, real estate, farming, etc., but at least the student gets practice in ap
plying theory systematically. Also, as a matter of technique, one may doubt
perhaps the advisability of using the long list of code-marks on the books
(sheet ii). No tidy bookkeeper likes to see his books all marked up, and, if I
am not mistaken, most modern practitioners prefer to make analyses of perti
nent accounts on their working papers.
Altogether it is a bit of practical work that reflects credit on its authors. Its
effectiveness in training students will be watched with interest by accounting
instructors and by the profession generally.
W. H. Lawton.
INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL TAXATION, by George T. Altman.
Commerce Clearing House, Inc., New York. 166 pages. 1936.
Introduction to Federal Taxation is, I believe, the first definite attempt to state
in simple narrative form the underlying principles of the federal revenue laws.
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Perhaps fifty years from now a work of this character could attain the position
of an authoritative work of reference. The present volume, however, deals
with a subject not yet sufficiently molded into its final form and is of no more
than passing interest, except to the student desiring to become well grounded
in the development of our revenue laws from their inception up to date.
The book is well written and logical in its presentation and, if properly under
stood as being only an introduction to federal taxation as stated in the title,
should cause the student reader to desire more up-to-date information to be
found only in one of the standard tax services.
Norman G. Chambers.
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, Committee on Public Relations, New
York Stock Exchange, April, 1936. 40 pages. 1936.

STOCK EXCHANGE PROCEDURE, by Birl E. Shultz, New York Stock
Exchange Institute, March, 1936. 102 pages. 1936.
These two excellent manuals would seem to be required reading for anyone
who has an interest, direct or indirect, in the work of the New York stock ex
change. Both of them are clearly written and well illustrated. The section
dealing with the work of the “specialist” is particularly valuable, as it gives a
clear statement of what is to many a complicated and mysterious function.
The short history of the exchange and its efforts, largely successful, to per
suade corporations to publish adequate information, and its constant endeavor
to raise and maintain the standard of ethics among its own members are inter
esting not only to men in Wall street, but to accountants, credit men and all
others whose work lies in the preparation or interpretation of financial state
ments.
Without laboring the point, in fact without referring to it specifically, it is
made clear that the exchange had, at the time of the passage of the securities
exchange act, gone a long way towards the goal to which that act gave it a
forcible and somewhat uncomfortable propulsion. The exchange authorities
state what everyone, I believe, admits to be the fact, that they have been and
are endeavoring to cooperate so far as lies within their ability with the securities
and exchange commission.
These two little books contain information which should be in the possession
of every practising accountant, but more particularly those who have to deal
with personal income taxes, investments, estate work and the many other parts
of an accountant’s practice which have to do with the statement and verifica
tion of securities and security values.
Maurice E. Peloubet

155

